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The comparative  
advantage fallacy and 
a rule for convergence
Esteban Pérez Caldentey and Anesa Ali
T he gains from trade argument is based on the principle of 
comparative advantage. However, this principle is predicated on “tacit” 
axioms, presenting an argument which supports a proposition different to 
the one it purports to prove. This paper presents an alternative treatment, 
using a leader-follower model to show that free trade can in fact accentuate 
differences and growth disparities between countries. More importantly, it 
argues that the follower economy can catch up with the leader economy 
only if the ratio between the income-elasticity of the follower country’s 
exports to the rest of the world and the income-elasticity of its imports is 
greater than the ratio between the induced productivity of the leader and 
that of the follower country. This is our rule for convergence.
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This paper argues that the guiding principle behind free 
trade theory, comparative advantage, is only valid for 
barter economies characterized by full employment and 
absence of uncertainty where differences in size and 
development level do not affect the final outcome, which 
in point of fact is a Pareto optimum. However, this does 
not imply that comparative advantage, or for that matter 
Say’s Law, can be applied to real-world economies.
This paper presents an alternative approach to the 
analysis of free trade using a leader-follower country 
model. The model is based on three pillars: cumulative 
causation, the technology gap, and the external constraint 
approach to growth. Using this framework, this paper 
presents a basic derivation of a rule for convergence.
This rule states that, given free trade, the follower 
economy can converge with the leader economy only if 
the ratio between the income-elasticity of demand for 
the follower country’s exports in the rest of the world 
and the income-elasticity of its demand for imports is 
greater than the ratio between the leader and follower 
country’s induced productivity.
The paper is structured in five sections. Following 
this introductory section, section II gives a brief 
presentation of the treatment of free trade in mainstream 
economic theory, including a summary explanation of 
the main theorems underpinning the idea of 
comparative advantage in international trade and 
the implications of these. Section III critically 
examines the principle of comparative advantage as 
underpinned by three tacit core axioms, namely the 
neutral money axiom, the gross substitution axiom 
and the ergodic axiom, discussing their meaning and 
examining their relevance.1
The fourth section presents our alternative model. 
In essence, this model states that convergence between 
the leader and follower economy can be modelled by the 
difference in Verdoorn-type equations. Their interaction 
is captured by the introduction of Thirlwall’s Law and 
a technological spillover function.
Within the logic of our model, money is not neutral 
since monetary arrangements ultimately determine the 
framework within which real forces operate. It also 
gives primacy to income over substitution effects. In 
fact, the model presented here is explicitly different 
from other contributions to this type of approach in the 
literature because the role of relative prices is markedly 
absent from the analysis. Lastly, the model assumes 
away the existence of an ergodic environment where, 
by definition, ensemble, spatial and temporal statistical 
averages converge on the same mean.
1 The critique of comparative advantage is undertaken in terms of the 
assumptions underpinning this basic foreign trade principle. According 
to Keynes (1973b, p. 21), Say’s Law is the “classical theory’s ‘axiom 
of parallels.’ Granted this all the rest follows… the unqualified advan-
tages of laissez-faire in respect to foreign trade and much else which 
we have to question.” As Davidson (1994 and 2002) explains, these 
three postulates (neutral money, gross substitution and the ergodic 
axiom) underlie Say’s Law. “Granted these all the rest follows.” The 
principle of comparative advantage is a special case of Say’s Law. 
There are other critiques of Say’s Law and comparative advantage 
based on internal consistency arguments or different methodological 
approaches. From the point of view of this paper’s authors, the “tacit 
assumptions” critique is the most potent of all those levelled at the 
principle of comparative advantage and at neo-classical theory more 
generally.
 The opinions expressed herein are the authors’ own and may not 
coincide with those of eclac or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Trinidad and Tobago. The authors are grateful for the comments of 
an anonymous referee. Comments are welcome and may be e-mailed 
to the authors. 
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II
The treatment of free trade in  
mainstream economic theory
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem complements 
the above theorem by stating that the intensive use of 
a factor of production for export (i.e., the abundant 
factor) raises its rate of return above that of all other 
factors. In turn, the consequent increase in the supply 
of that factor of production will lead to an increase in 
the output of the commodity that is intensive in that 
factor of production (the Rybczynski theorem). Lastly, 
the factor price-equalization theorem, stating that trade 
equalizes factor returns across countries, wraps up the 
case for free trade.3
The introduction of dynamic factors such as spillover 
effects does not alter the validity of the basic analysis. 
Indeed, it can be shown that if knowledge is freely mobile 
and equally accessible among countries, patterns of 
specialization are determined by comparative advantage.4 
That is, by construction in mainstream theory, static and 
dynamic trade theory are one and the same thing when 
free trade (implying laissez-faire and laissez-passer) 
prevails. There is absolutely no fundamental distinction 
between the two.
3 Under conditions of perfect competition, trade in goods acts as a 
substitute for factor mobility. Under conditions of imperfect competition, 
free trade does not result in the full equalization of commodity prices 
and factor returns across countries. However, free trade does reduce 
differentials and thus acts as a force for convergence.
4 See Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (1996). The 
existence of economies of scale can lead to trade creation through 
production, consumption and cost reduction effects. The production 
effect allows the transfer of production to the lower-cost trading 
partner. The consumption effect refers to the gain in the consumer 
surplus due to lower prices. The cost reduction effect denotes a switch 
to cheaper sources of supply. Dunn and Muti (2000) identify three 
effects that can increase the efficiency of free trade: (i) a shift in output 
that increases its price by more than its average cost; (ii) a scale effect 
that reduces firms’ average costs of production when output expands; 
(iii) an increase in trade permitting greater diversification of the final 
goods and intermediate inputs being traded.
According to mainstream economic theory, free trade 
creates welfare gains by allowing consumers and 
firms to purchase from the cheapest source of supply. 
This ensures that production is located according to 
comparative advantage. In other words, free trade allows 
the principle of comparative advantage to operate by 
suppressing discrimination between such sources of 
supply as may exist.
The properties of the standard mainstream free trade 
model based on comparative advantage, the Heckscher-Ohlin 
or Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model,2 are to be found in 
four well-known theorems: (i) the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, 
(ii) the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, (iii) the Rybczynski 
theorem, and (iv) the factor-price equalization theorem.
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem establishes a relationship 
between factor scarcity and factor embodiment in a 
commodity such that countries export the commodity which 
intensively uses the abundant factor. It provides the basis 
for the gains from trade argument, such gains consisting 
of the increase in output and real income for a given set of 
inputs or domestic resources resulting from trade. 
2  The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model was renamed Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (H-O-S) after Samuelson formalized the basis properties 
of the H-O model.
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III
Comparative advantage and its tacit axioms
of change in relative prices is proportional to the excess 
demand function. In other words, it converges towards 
equilibrium and is globally stable as a result. This is 
expressed formally as:
(2) 
Lim p(t) = p*
tmd
where p* is a vector of equilibrium prices.
In the particular case of the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model, the axiom of gross substitution is 
strengthened by the fact that it assumes production 
functions and factor quality to be the same across countries. 
In other words, the rate of marginal substitution among 
factors is the same.
Ergodicity implies that ensemble, spatial and 
temporal averages converge to the same mean. In other 
words, a given system converges towards a unique globally 
stable equilibrium irrespective of the initial conditions 
or the trajectory followed. It also implies homogeneity, 
that is, that every member of a given ensemble possesses 
the same statistical behaviour as the whole ensemble. 
As a result, the statistical behaviour of an ensemble can 
be deduced from the behaviour of one sample function. 
The behaviour of the sample function is representative 
of that of the whole ensemble.
Turning to the core of mainstream trade theory, the 
axioms of neutrality, gross substitution and ergodicity 
are what underpin the operation and validity of the 
comparative advantage principle.
Expenditure is directed towards the cheapest 
commodity, leading to changes in relative commodity 
prices, production levels, the demand for factors and 
their respective real remuneration rates. The process 
leads to price equalization, full employment and net 
welfare gains for all trading partners. In other words, 
“free trade is best”.
Moreover, the core axioms imply that initial 
conditions are irrelevant to the final outcome. That is, 
differences in the trading partners’ size and development 
level do not affect the final outcome. Trade affects all 
countries alike and development level and size are a 
non-issue. As a result, there is no need and no room in 
trade theory and policy for any type of asymmetrical 
treatment whatsoever. Instead, the sole aim of trade 
The principle of comparative advantage and its purported 
benefits are based on three tacit axioms: neutral money, 
gross substitution and the ergodic axiom (Davidson, 
1994, pp. 17-18; 2000, p. 171; 2002, pp. 43-44).5
A neutral economy is one where money is “a neutral 
link among real transactions and the effects of monetary 
changes on real transactions is transitory”.6 As a result, 
economic transactions taking place by virtue of each of 
these approaches are carried out in terms of physical 
goods and persons, whether consisting of trade in goods or 
factors of production and their remuneration, production 
processes involving a given level of technology, or the 
allocation of resources between alternative productive 
uses. Money does not in any way affect the economic 
process, which behaves like that of a barter economy.7 
Money is inessential and does not enter in any way into 
decision-making.8
The axiom of gross substitution means that any 
good can be substituted for by any other. Two goods 
are said to be gross substitutes when
(1) z p > 0 z p > 01 2 2 1/ y /
where zi (p1, p2) is an excess demand function and p1 
and p2 are the money prices of goods 1 and 2.
The axiom of gross substitution implies that a price 
path follows a process of adjustment such that the rate 
5 Davidson (2000, p. 160) refers to open economy models of the 
1960s which were developed using the core axioms above to “prove 
that free trade and optimum global economic growth required a 
laissez-faire approach”.
6 See Rymes (1989, pp. 47-49). Keynes (1979, p. 78) defined a neutral 
economy as one “in which the factors are hired by entrepreneurs for 
money but where there is a mechanism of some kind to ensure that the 
exchange value of the money incomes of the factors is always equal 
in the aggregate to the proportion of current output which would have 
been the factor’s share in a co-operative economy”.
7 Schumpeter (1954) also distinguished between real analysis and 
monetary analysis. The former denotes that part of monetary thinking 
which views and understands economic relationships in real terms, 
that is, in barter terms.
8 See, for example, the attempt by Samuelson (1976, p. 640) to introduce 
monetary factors into a standard neoclassical model of international 
trade. He writes: “..it is shown that the original Ohlin position was 
right in its contention that there would be a tendency for free trade in 
goods to serve as a partial substitute for factor mobility and thereby 
serve to reduce but not wipe out difference in factor prices”. Hence 
money is an inessential addition to the mainstream framework.
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policy should be to ensure the fluid operation of free 
market mechanisms.9
The purported benefits of the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model and regional integration theory follow 
logically from a set of premises that automatically guarantee 
full employment and welfare improvements irrespective 
of the trading partners’ initial conditions and the strength 
of trade linkages between them. If the comparative 
advantage principle applies, free trade and “free trade 
areas” for that matter can only be “welfare improving 
areas”, irrespective of geographical extent. It is actually all 
a matter of degree. The greater their geographical extent, 
the greater the improvement in welfare.10
However, this does not mean that comparative 
advantage is welfare-improving in a world more akin to 
the real world where the axioms of neutrality, gross
9  The current drive for bilateral trading arrangements in the Americas 
is squarely based on these tacit axioms.
10 See footnote 3 above.
11 Ignoratio elenchi was first identified by Aristotle in On Sophistical 
Refutations. It translates literally as ignorance of what constitutes a 
refutation and consists in proving an argument wholly different from 
the one purportedly being proved. Keynes (1973b, p. 259) mentions 
the fallacy. According to Carabelli (1991, p. 123) it belongs to the 
informal fallacy of relevance category. An informal fallacy of rele-
vance establishes a relationship between the relevance/irrelevance of 
the premises of arguments and their conclusions. Irrelevance means 
that the premises and the conclusion are not connected. The fallacy is 
explained by the fact that the key assumptions of neoclassical theory 
(and indeed the core axioms) are tacit. Keynes (1973a, p. 79) argues 
that “…you will search in vain for any express statements of the 
simplifications which have been introduced or for the relationship of 
its [the neutral economy’s] hypothetical conclusions to the facts of 
the real world”. (The square brackets in the citation were introduced 
by the authors of this paper). See Keynes (1979, pp. 408-411) for a 
similar argument.
substitution and ergodicity are not satisfied. Indeed, the 
application of orthodox trade principles to the “real world” 
raises the suspicion that the whole argument for free trade 
may fall prey to the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, i.e., that 
of proving or supporting a proposition different to the 
one it is purporting to prove or support.11 It is thus not 
surprising that, for example, empirical studies analysing 
the welfare effects of the formation of free trade areas 
find that the evidence is decidedly ambiguous.12
Changing the core premises and introducing non-
neutral money, income rather than substitution effects 
and a non-ergodic environment can radically alter the 
conclusions of mainstream trade theory and regional 
integration theory. This is shown in the next section, 
which presents a simple model for two economies of 
different sizes and development levels.
12 Panagariya (2000) distinguishes two approaches to this issue. The 
first is based on some type of general equilibrium model whereby, 
starting from a base model with a given structure and parameters, tariff 
barriers among trading partners are removed. The second is based on 
gravity equation estimates. Panagariya (2000, p. 326) writes: “Consider 
first the simulation approach. It is relatively easy to manipulate the 
structure of the model, functional forms and parameter values in these 
models to obtain one’s desired results.” Regarding gravity equation 
estimates, the criticism focuses on the fact that the success of regional 
trade agreements is based on aggregate trade creation or diversion, 
when in fact the question is to identify whether trade creation has 
occurred at the sectoral level, and this requires a great deal of in-
formation that is difficult to obtain. Lastly, it is to be noted that the 
analytical exercise dealing with trade creation-trade diversion does 
not cover two aspects that are crucial for trade negotiations: trade in 
services, which is the main form of international trade for the smaller 
economies of the Caribbean, and the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and free trade areas.
13  McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and León-Ledesma (2002) extend 
the Kaldorian cumulative growth model to include the technological 
gap approach. For conceptual purposes, the cumulative and technolo-
gical gap approach are treated as two different approaches to growth 
(see Castellacci, 2001).
IV
An alternative approach to free trade:  
a simple two-country model
The model is built on three approaches to economic growth. 
The first is encapsulated in Kaldor’s notion of cumulative 
causation and its development in the work of McCombie and 
Thirlwall (1994) and McCombie, Pugno and Soro (2002). 
The second follows the balance-of-payments constraint 
approach to growth as developed by Thirlwall (1979) and 
McCombie and Thirlwall (1994).13 Lastly, the third strand 
is the technological gap approach to growth.
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issue. As a result, countries’ export potential must be 
commensurate with their import capacity.
Over the long run, consequently, countries must 
maintain equilibrium in the balance of payments or at 
least in the basic balance, since in the long run they 
can only grow at rates compatible with their external 
position. It is in this sense that countries are said to be 
balance-of-payments-constrained.15
Within this framework, money is not neutral. A 
process of technological “catch-up” through imitation 
derived from a process of cumulative causation cannot 
occur if economies do not have the means to obtain the 
reserve currency. More to the point, the extent to which 
countries can benefit from a “catch-up” process depends 
on the extent to which they can access international 
liquidity. Accordingly, in our approach, by contrast 
with mainstream theory, monetary factors provide the 
framework for the operation and development of real 
forces, such as innovation.
The model postulates the existence of two economies, 
one developed and the other developing. By definition, 
the developing economy is also the smaller economy. 
The developed economy is termed the leader (denoted by 
subscript l) and the developing economy is the follower 
economy (denoted by subscript f). 
The leader has higher levels of productivity and is 
technologically more advanced. The follower economy 
is assumed at this stage to be closely linked to the leader 
economy. It is furthermore assumed that the leader 
economy issues the international reserve currency, which 
is by definition also used by the follower economy. As 
a result, the follower country is balance-of-payments-
constrained while the leader country is not.
The model begins by defining the technology gap 
(Gp) between the leader and the follower economy (Pl 
and Pf, respectively) in logarithmic terms such that the 
rate of growth of the gap (g) can be expressed as the 
difference between the rates of productivity change in the 
leader and follower country (McCombie and Thirlwall, 
1994; Targetti and Foti, 1997). That is,
(3) G = Ln (P /P )p l f
(4) g = p - pfl
15  Countries are balance-of-payments-constrained in the sense that 
“their performance in overseas markets, and the response of the world 
financial markets to this performance, constrains the rate of growth of 
the economy to a rate which is below that which internal conditions 
would warrant” (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1999, p. 49).
The cumulative causation approach views growth 
as being internally generated. Technological innovation 
through the growth of embodied or disembodied 
productivity generates growth in demand which feeds 
back into productivity growth. The growth linkage 
between productivity and demand is explained by terms-
of-trade effects, increased income and expenditure, 
and changes in income distribution. The linkage from 
demand to productivity is explained by returns to scale, 
specialization and market size, embodied technical 
progress and learning by doing (Castellacci, 2001). 
From this perspective, growth is generated internally 
through innovation activity.
This approach disparages the notion of equilibrium 
and thus of convergence and stability. However, it does 
not deal with technological spillovers between countries 
or the international diffusion that can occur through trade 
linkages, i.e., it does not address the issue of country 
interdependence. Such interdependence is one of the 
main hypotheses of the technological gap approach.
The technological gap approach asserts that a 
country’s growth rate depends on its level of technological 
development. It also states that countries whose 
technological level is below the world innovation frontier 
can increase their rate of growth through a process of 
“catching up” or imitation. Lastly, the absorptive capacity 
of such countries depends on their “ability to mobilize 
resources for transforming social, institutional and 
economic structures” (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2001, 
p. 11). The technological gap approach recognizes that 
all countries are not alike, that development levels are 
an important determinant of growth and welfare and that 
not all countries benefit to a similar extent from trade 
and the transmission of trade linkages.
The third approach, the balance-of-payments 
constraint approach, asserts that trade performance, trade 
linkages and growth cannot be understood or analysed in 
real or “barter” terms. Trade and growth are intimately 
linked to the architecture and workings of the existing 
international financial order, and these are the main 
constraint on economic growth and development.14
International trade is not carried out in real, “barter” 
terms but in money terms and more precisely in terms of 
the international reserve currency or currencies. Countries 
can build up their economic infrastructure and develop by 
importing capital, raw materials, inputs and technology 
only if they are able to acquire the reserve currency or 
currencies, which the great majority of countries cannot 
14  See Davidson (1992, pp. 93-96; 2002, pp. 158-161).
l
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The rates of productivity growth in the leader and 
follower economies are equal to the sum of the rates 
of growth of autonomous (exogenous) and induced 
productivities. That is, they are modelled according to 
Verdoorn’s Law.16 The interpretation of the autonomous 
and induced coefficients adopted in this paper is that 
of Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) and McCombie and 
Thirlwall (1994).17
As stated by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, p. 464), 
autonomous productivity depends on “the autonomous 
rate of disembodied technical progress, the autonomous 
rate of capital accumulation, and the degree to which 
technical progress is embodied in capital accumulation”. 
For obvious reasons, the rate of autonomous productivity 
growth is higher in the leader economy than in the 
smaller country (i.e., pl > pf).
For its part, induced productivity is captured by the 
parameter λ, also known as the Verdoorn coefficient. 
Again as stated by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), 
it is a function of “‘learning by doing’, the degree to 
which capital accumulation is induced by economic 
growth (yl and yf for the leader and follower economies, 
respectively) and the extent to which technical progress 
is embodied in capital accumulation”.18
Formally,
(5) p p yl la l l + L
(6) p p yf fa f f + L
Note that, as formulated, equations (5) and (6) 
capture the presence of increasing returns due to the 
greater specialization induced by economic growth.19 In 
turn, a greater degree of specialization entails a higher 
rate of growth, which permits the expansion of the 
16  Verdoorn’s Law is a “statistical relationship between the long-run 
rate of growth of labour productivity and the rate of growth of output, 
usually in the industrial sector” (McCombie, Pugno and Soro, 2002, 
p. 1). This relationship was formulated by Verdoorn (1949) and restated 
as a law by Kaldor (1966).
17  Soro (2002, pp. 45-53) considers three interpretations of Verdoorn’s 
Law. The first two were suggested by Verdoorn and are based on 
complementarity and perfect substitutability of the factors of pro-
duction. The third, which is the one adopted in this paper, follows the 
Kaldorian interpretation. A key component of Kaldor’s interpretation 
is the existence of increasing returns to scale. Following Young (1928), 
Kaldor subscribed to a macroeconomic rather than microeconomic 
concept of increasing returns. See Soro (2002) and Chandra and 
Sandilands (2005).
18 A value of λ > 0.5 indicates the presence of increasing returns.
19  This means that increasing returns derive from specialization rather 
than scale. This is the position of Allyn Young and Nicholas Kaldor. 
See Young (1990).
potential for specialization. Hence, the process described 
by equations (5) and (6) is cumulative.
As stated earlier, the follower economy is balance-
of-payments-constrained. That is, its rate of growth 
has to conform in the long run to the rate of growth 
consistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium. Such 
is not the case with the leader economy because it issues 
the international reserve currency.
In view of the ample empirical evidence corroborating 
balance-of-payments constraint models (Thirlwall and 
McCombie, 2004), the model postulates that income 
effects predominate over substitution effects and that 
the long-term growth rate of the follower economy (yf) 
is determined by Thirlwall’s Law. That is, the long-term 
growth rate of the follower economy (yf) is determined 
by the long-term growth rate of the leader economy 
(yl) multiplied by the income-elasticity ratio between 
the follower country’s exports to the rest of the world 
(π) and the income-elasticity of its demand for imports 
(ξ). Formally,
(7) y = y ( / )f l P X
Successive substitution of equation (7) into equation 
(6) and of equations (5) and (6) into equation (4) yields 
the following expression for the rate of change in the 
productivity gap:
(8) g = (p -p )+ y - ( / ) (p -p )+la fa l la faL L P Xl f ly  y ( - ( / )l L L P Xl f
Equation (8) shows that the rate of change in the 
productivity gap over time will depend on the following 
factors: (i) the differences in autonomous productivities; 
(ii) the rate of growth in the leader economy; (iii) the 
difference between the Verdoorn coefficient in the leader 
country and that in the follower country, augmented 
by the ratio between the income-elasticities of the 
leader country’s exports to the rest of the world and the 
income-elasticities of its imports. By contrast with other 
approaches found in the literature, relative prices do not 
play a role in the workings of Verdoorn’s law.20
20  The approach adopted in this paper follows the post-Keynesian tra-
dition in emphasizing income over substitution effects (Davidson, 1992, 
p. 22). On this view, relative prices do not play a role in determining 
the long-run gdp growth rate or the productivity gap. See Dixon and 
Thirlwall (1975) and León-Ledesma (2002) for a different approach 
in which the effect of Verdoorn’s Law is captured through its effect 
on relative prices. Relative prices determine exports, which in turn 
determine the rate of output growth. If the price-elasticity of the export 
demand function is insignificant, then Verdoorn’s Law plays no role 
whatsoever in determining this rate. In other words, increasing returns 
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According to equation (8), as long as π < ξ then 
the rate of growth in the productivity gap will increase 
(mainly because pla > pfa and λl > λl, leading to a 
process of divergence, and the follower country will 
not catch up with the leader economy. This finding 
holds for any given level of output growth in the leader 
economy.Moreover, equation (8) shows that when the 
leader economy’s growth rate approximates to zero, the 
rate of growth in the productivity gap (g) is equal to 
the difference between the autonomous productivities. 
According to equation (8), lastly, positive growth rates 
in the leader economy (yl) increase the growth rate of 
the follower economy (yf). In other words, growth in 
the leader economy is a force for convergence. This 
follows from Thirlwall’s Law (equation 7). But at the 
same time, growth in the leader economy increases the 
rate of growth of g, when π > ξ (equation 8).21 As a 
result, increases in yl constitute an additional force for 
divergence in g. That is,
(9)  u u g y/ = ( - ( / ya que > y ( /l l f l fL L P X L L P X) ) 1
Within the framework provided by equation (8), 
there is no inherent mechanism for convergence. Rather, 
the initial conditions (i.e., higher productivity in the 
leader country and the higher value added of its exports 
relative to its imports), and thus the principle of absolute 
advantage, are what will determine the outcome of a 
free trade agreement between the leader and follower 
countries.
A closer approximation to a convergence mechanism 
can be arrived at by assuming that the difference in 
autonomous productivities between the leader and 
follower economies is equal to zero (pla – pfa = 0). 
Taking this hypothesis, it can be shown that the rate of 
change in the gap will increase, decrease or be equal 
to zero depending on whether the ratio of the Verdoorn 
coefficients between the leader and follower economies 
is greater than, less than or equal to the ratio between 
the income-elasticity of the follower country’s exports 
to the rest of the world and the income-elasticity of its 
imports. That is,
and the process of cumulative causation are dependent on the workings 
of relative prices. Ultimately, therefore, these models rest the weight 
of the analysis on the validity of the gross substitution axiom.
21 This result can be inferred from Thirlwall’s Law. See, for example, 
Moreno and Pérez Caldentey (2003). As is shown here, this result 
presupposes that the autonomous and induced productivities in the 
leader economy surpass those of the follower economy.
(10) 
>0 >0 >
g = 0 y ( -l L Ll f ( / )) = 0 / = /
<0
P X L L P X l f
<0 <
In other words, excluding discrete changes in the 
Verdoorn coefficients, closing the induced productivity 
gap requires that the difference in induced productivity 
between the leader and follower economy be offset by 
improved external performance in the latter (that is,  
must increase and/or π ξ must decrease). Changes in 
these parameters may reflect demand factors only or 
rather the effects of specialization, allocative efficiency 
and embodied technology.22
Up to this point the development of the model 
assumed that the Verdoorn equations, and more specifically 
the induced productivities of the leader and follower 
countries, were independent of one another. However, 
when countries trade and become more integrated, 
their performance is influenced by each other’s level 
22 There are three competing hypotheses in the balance-of-payments-
constrained literature regarding the determinants of the income-elasticities 
of imports and exports. The first follows from Prebisch and Singer and 
relates the size of the elasticity parameters to the manufacturing and 
technological content of the products exported and imported. According 
to this reasoning, the income-elasticity of exports increases as external 
sales move up the value-added chain from commodities to semipro-
cessed labour- and resource- intensive goods, then to manufactures 
with low, medium and high skill and technology content. In the case 
of developing economies, the income-elasticity of demand for their 
exports in the rest of the world is low and the income-elasticity of their 
demand for imports is high. Less developed countries exporting com-
modities subject to Engel’s Law are usually in this category (Davidson, 
1992). The main policy implication, following the logic of Thirlwall’s 
Law, is that unless countries undergo a process of structural change 
that alters the elasticity parameters, the cleavage between developed 
and developing economies will widen over time and less developed 
countries are condemned to poverty. The second hypothesis states that 
while the income-elasticity of a country’s demand for imports tends 
to remain more or less constant, the income-elasticity of its exports 
to the rest of the world varies over time with the level of development 
(Bairam, 1997). More specifically, the income-elasticity of demand 
for a country’s exports in the rest of the world is inversely related to 
its level of development and tends to decline as this level rises. As 
a result, increases in external demand or expansionary phases in the 
global cycle (or that of the country’s main trading partners) have a 
positive effect on developing countries’ external position. The third 
hypothesis maintains that changes in the said income-elasticities are 
brought about by shifts in commercial policy or measures designed to 
transfer liquidity between countries, or both. Changes in commercial 
policy involve changes in trade barriers (tariffs and quotas). Measures 
to recycle liquidity comprise increases in surplus nations’ imports and 
unilateral transfers from surplus to deficit nations (Davidson, 1992, 
p. 153). Thus far the empirical work shows that the income-elasticity 
of imports rises with trade liberalization and that the income-elasticity 
of exports depends on what the market and consumers and producers 
are demanding at a given time. Thus, while the income-elasticity of 
imports depends on institutional factors which include changes in 
commercial policy, as per the third hypothesis, there seems to be no 
clear core factor determining the income-elasticity of exports.
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of economic development. That is, interdependence 
generates spillover effects between countries. One of the 
most important channels for the transmission of economic 
development is the diffusion of knowledge.23
Within the setting of our model, the spillover 
effects of knowledge are transmitted from the bigger, 
more developed economy (the leader) to the smaller, 
less developed one (the follower) via the absorptive or 
learning capacity of the latter. This capacity is limited 
by the extent of the productivity gap between the two 
economies.24 The greater the absorptive capacity of the 
follower, the more powerful the knowledge spillover 
effect.25
Following Targetti and Foti (1997), induced 
productivity can be modelled as a non-linear function 
of the gap. Formally,
(11) L JQ Qf = a (1/ G ) (e ) = a e0 -G/ -G/( )
where
a = factor of proportionality.
ϕ = (1/G0) = inverse of the initial productivity gap and 
0 < ϕ <1.
θ =  parameter reflecting the adaptability or learning 
capacity of the follower economy.
According to equation (11), induced productivity 
in the follower country is proportional to the inverse of 
the initial productivity gap. That is, the greater (smaller) 
the initial productivity gap, the lower (higher) ϕ will be 
and, other things being equal, the weaker (stronger) the 
spillover effect.
Equation (11) is also a function of the extent to which 
the follower economy is able to acquire and incorporate 
knowledge from the leader economy (i.e., of the absorptive 
or learning capacity of the follower economy).26 This 
23  See Helpman (2004, pp. 60-69) and Rogers (2004).
24  See Nelson and Phelps (1966), Abramovitz (1986), Targetti and 
Foti (1997) and Rogers (2004).
25  According to Abramovitz (1979, 1986 and 1995), countries can 
realize their catch-up potential if they exhibit “social capability” and 
“technological congruence” and possess natural resource endow-
ments. The term “social capability” includes a wide variety of factors, 
including social attitudes and political institutions, educational attain-
ment, organizational and commercial skills and adequate levels of 
infrastructure. The term “technological congruence” refers to the fact 
that technology in the leader economy may not always be appropriate 
for the follower economy (Verspagen and Los, 2002; Criscuolo and 
Narula, 2002).
26  Absorptive capacity is defined by Dahlman and Nelson (1995) as 
“the ability to learn and implement the technologies and associated 
practices of already developed countries”. It is a narrower concept than 
is captured by e-G/θ The basic mathematical properties 
of equation (11) are listed below and figure 1 plots the 
function.








f / (e ) >0






“social capability”. According to Rogers (2004, p. 579), absorptive 
or learning capacity depends on “accessibility to overseas technol-
ogy, learning ability, and the incentives or barriers to implementing 
new technologies”.
Induced productivity is an increasing function 
of the parameter θ. However, as θ increases, induced 
productivity tends to the limit (1/G0). That is, the extent 
to which the follower country is able to use its learning 
capacity to catch up with the leader economy is bounded 
by the initial productivity gap (G0). This is in fact the 
boundary of the country’s learning capacity. The greater 
the initial productivity gap, the lower the “learning 
capacity boundary”, as shown in figure 1 by the difference 
between the continuous straight line (corresponding 
to (G0) and the dashed straight line (corresponding to 
Gl0 and Gl0 > G0). Similarly, any increase in the actual 
gap, whatever its initial size, reduces the follower’s 
induced productivity. This too is shown in figure 1, by 
the difference between the straight and dashed lines 
of induced productivities (λf and λf1, respectively), 
which correspond to different sizes of gap (G and Gl , 
respectively, where Gl > G).
Substituting equation (11) into equation (8) yields 
the following expression for the rate of change in the 
gap:
(13) g = (p - p ) + y - (a e y ( / ))la fa l -G/ lL J P XQl
 (p - p ) +y ( - (a e ( / ))la fa l -G/L J P XQl
Equation (13) shows several important features of 
the “gap dynamics”. First, for any given level of yl and of 
(π/ξ), the direction of change in the gap will depend on 
the difference between the rate of growth in autonomous 
productivities, the induced productivity of the leader 
and the extent to which the follower country can benefit 
from the spillover effects, which basically depends on 
its adaptability or learning capacity (θ).
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Second, an increase in the leader country’s growth 
rate (yl) will produce both divergent and convergent 
effects on the follower country’s ability to catch up or 
narrow the gap. It will translate into an increase in the 
follower country’s growth rate through the workings of 
Thirlwall’s Law. The magnitude of the pull effect exerted 
by the leader on the follower country will depend on the 
ratio between the income-elasticities of the follower’s 
exports to the rest of the world and the income-elasticity 
of its imports (π/ξ). In this way, growth in the leader 
country will narrow the gap, but at the same time it will 
widen it through its induced productivity effect (ylλl). 
Formally, by taking the derivative of g with respect 
to yl, it can be shown that the gap may be divergent, 
convergent or neutral. That is,
(14) u ug/ y = - (a e ( / )l -G/L J P XQl
and
(15) ∂ ∂ ⇒ ⇔g y > 0 - (a e ( )) >0 (a el l -G/q l -G/ / /λ ϕ ξ λ ϕ / q ) >
( ) :π/ Trayectoria divergente de la bξ recha.
/ /∂ ∂ ⇒ ⇔g y = 0 - (a e ( )) =0l l -G/q lλ ϕ ξ λ /
/ Trayectoria neutra de l




/∂ ∂ ⇒g y < 0 - (a e ( )) <0l l -G/q/ λ ϕ ξ ⇔ λ ϕ
ξ
l
-G /q(a e ) <
( ) :
/






According to the set of equations (15), growth in 
the leader economy (yl) will narrow (widen, not affect) 
the rate of growth in the gap only if the differences in 
the induced productivities of the leader and follower 
economies are smaller than (larger than, equal to) the 
difference between the income-elasticity of the follower 
country’s exports and the income-elasticity of its demand 
for imports, i.e., (λl /aϕ e-G/θ) < (π/ξ); (λl /aϕ e-G/) > 
(π/ξ); (λl /aϕ e-G/θ) = (π/ξ).
The same result (i.e., the same relationships and 
conclusion) holds in general terms when yl > 0, assuming 
that for analytical purposes the difference in the rate 
of growth in autonomous productivities is equal to 0. 
Under these assumptions, equation (13) can provide a 
benchmark or criterion for convergence. That is,
(16) g= y (l - (a je ( x))l l -G /q /
and





-G /q L J X L J/ /
) :/  Trayectoria divergente de la brecha.X
g= 0 - (a e ( ) =0 (a e ) =l -G/q l -G /q L J X L J/ /
( ) :
g<
/  Trayectoria neutra de la brecha.X





-G /q L J X L J
X
/ /
/ ) :  Trayectoria convergente de la brecha.
FIGURE 1
Induced productivity of the follower country 
Gl0 < G0 y Gl < G
θ
a(1/G0)   
a(1/Gl0)
 λfl = a(1/G0) (el-G/θ)
 λf = a(1/G0) (e-G/θ)
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Divergent g p path.
Neutral gap path.
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Both sets of equations, (15) and (17), point to the 
fact that no parameter (whether it be learning capacity 
θ or the elasticity of exports or imports), and no policy 
aimed at a single objective, can guarantee convergence. 
As an example, policies to increase the relative elasticity 
of the leader country’s income-elasticity of exports (say, 
policies to encourage the production of goods with high 
income-elasticity)27 may prove unsuccessful unless 
induced productivity differences can be offset (because 
complementary policies are in place to improve learning 
capacity or because the policies themselves have a positive 
effect on learning capacity in the follower country).
27 These may well be efficiency improvement policies.
V
Conclusion
The principle of comparative advantage is the cornerstone 
of mainstream trade theory. It is held to ensure the 
realization of welfare gains by allowing consumers and 
firms to purchase from the cheapest source of supply.
Comparative advantage forms the basis for the 
argument that free trade is best and that the gains from 
trade can only be realized under a laissez-faire regime. 
However, its underlying assumptions (the axioms of neutral 
money, gross substitution and ergodicity) make the entire 
argument prey to the ignoratio elenchi fallacy.
This paper presents an alternative framework for 
analysing the effects of free trade, exemplified at this 
stage of our work in progress by a two-country model 
consisting of a leader and a follower. The leader is more 
developed and also issues the international reserve 
currency.
Our framework is based on three approaches to 
economic growth: cumulative causation, the technological 
gap and balance-of-payments constraint.
Cumulative causation departs from the notion of 
equilibrium and convergence: differences in productivity 
and growth can persist and widen over time. According 
to this approach, the impetus for growth and the 
interrelationship between growth and productivity are 
generated internally. The technological gap formula 
addresses the issue of country interdependence and is a 
vehicle for analysing the spillovers from trade. The third 
approach complements the other two by providing the 
monetary context within which they operate.
According to the model presented, there is no 
mechanism that can guarantee the optimality of free 
trade, convergence between countries or indeed any 
predictable outcome. The final outcome of free trade 
may depend on a variety of parameters and variables. 
It may even be shaped by history, critical decisions and 
unforeseen events.
The model suggests that the growth impetus of the 
leader economy has both a convergent and a divergent 
effect on the follower country. The convergent effect 
works through two channels: adaptive capacity and 
Thirlwall’s Law. The divergent effect works through 
the induced productivity and cumulative causation 
mechanisms.
In addition, it asserts that all the follower country 
can do is to take advantage (through spillover effects) of 
the productivity gains of the leader country. The extent 
to which the follower country can profit from spillovers 
depends on its adaptability (i.e., its learning capacity 
and its ability to earn reserve currency) and its initial 
conditions, including its stock of currency. As a result, 
monetary policies that soften the balance-of-payments 
constraint can be as important as educational policies 
aimed at improving human capital. 
Lastly, the model states that the follower can narrow 
the gap with the leader country only if the difference 
in the elasticities ratio is greater than the difference in 
the induced productivity coefficients. Countries gain 
nothing in terms of convergence by improving their net 
export potential unless it offsets the induced productivity 
differential. This is a rule of convergence proposed and 
upheld in this article, and it should provide a benchmark 
and guideline for economic policy design.
(Original: English)
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